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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
Case No. 21033
Category No. 2

WILLIAM H. BABBELL,
Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
The statement of the case and statement of facts are set
forth previously in Appellant's Brief at 1-6.

The Appellant takes

this opportunity to reply to the Respondent's Brief.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
(Reply to Respondent's Point I)

THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF MR. BABBELL'S PROPERTY VIOLATED
HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.
A. DETECTIVE CAZIER'S SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT DID NOT
AFFORD PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUSTAIN ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT TO
SEARCH AND SEIZE MR. BABBELL*S PROPERTY.
In his opening brief, Mr. Babbell argued that Detective
Cazier's "Affidavit for Search Warrant" could not have led a neutral
magistrate to conclude that probable cause existed for issuing the

requested warrant.
two grounds:

Appellant attacked the affidavit's sufficiency on

First, the affidavit wholly failed to indicate the basis

for any characterization of Mr. Babbell's alleged "modus operandi,"
and second, the affidavit withheld the truth from the magistrate
concerning the similarities and the substantial differences between
the truck witnesses described to Cazier and Mr. Babbell's truck.

In

demonstrating the affidavit's insufficiency under Utah Code Ann.
§77-23-2, §77-23-3, §77-23-12 (1953 as amended) and under the
Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines, Appellant highlighted the only paragraph
in the affidavit which even mentioned him:
Based on the modus operadi of the suspect and
the description of the suspect, Detective
Virgil Johnson, Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office, believed the vehicle may belong to
William Babbell. The detectives drove by the
address of the suspect, 8558 South 3830 West,
and noticed a truck in the driveway that
matched the description. The suspect's mother,
a resident at the address, gave the detectives
permission to look at the truck. (See
Appellant's Brief, Addendum A ) .
In its response to Appellant's argument, the state makes
three erroneous contentions:

(1)

the Appellant focused upon only

one of the affidavit's paragraphs (the one quoted above) when
evaluating the affidavit's sufficiency rather than viewing the
affidavit as a whole as required by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983), (2) Detective Cazier's reference, in his affidavit, to the
"modus operandi" information he received from Detective Johnson "was
of little importance in establishing probable cause," and (3) the
evaluation of the search warrant affidavit should be governed by the
Gates "totality of the circumstances" standard rather than the
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-

Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines, in part because the affidavit under
scrutiny in this case does not contain information received from an
informant.

(see Respondent's Brief at pp. 9-12).

The state also

erroneously concludes, summarily and without demonstration, that
Detective Cazier's affidavit "provided a substantial basis upon
which the magistrate could have concluded that probable cause
existed for the issuance of the warrant." (Respondent's Brief at p.
10).
In reply, Mr. Babbell contends that he did evaluate the
affidavit as a whole and that when so viewed the affidavit does not
supply probable cause to sustain the issuance of a warrant under
either the Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines or the Gates "totality of the
circumstances" standard.

Appellant further contends that the

affidavit does contain the tip of an informant, albeit a fellow
officer.*

Yet nowhere does the affidavit supply the magistrate with

any indication of the factual basis for the tip, nor does the
affidavit indicate whether the affiant ever bothered to substantiate
the volunteered "modus operandi" information.

In addition, as

indicated above, the affidavit fails to indicate how the Appellant's
truck matched the witnesses' descriptions of the assailant's truck.
Without significantly more particularized information before him
during his probable cause deliberations, the magistrate below had no

^By way of reply to the state's second contention (see the
enumerated contentions immediately above), it can simply be noted
that the "modus operandi" tip supplied to Cazier was one of the
listed "facts" linking Appellant to the assault on Ms. Sine; it is
entirely unreasonable, therefore, to conclude that the circuit court
magistrate did not rely (perhaps centrally) upon the tip in his
probable cause deliberations.
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"substantial basis" for issuing the requested warrant.

State v.

Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985) (citing Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (I960)).
In State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984) this
Court acknowledged that "even under [the Gates totality of the
circumstances] standard, compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli
guidelines may.be necessary to make a sufficient basis for probable
cause."

Regardless of whether the Court is prepared to announce

that the Aguilar-Spinelli test for the sufficiency of an affidavit
is mandated by Art. I Section 14 of the the state Constitution2 (see
Respondent's Brief at p. 12), Appellant contends that the present
case is precisely one of those situations alluded to in Bailey
requiring the application of the Aguilar-Spinelli safeguards. While

2

The Washington Supreme Court serves as a prime example of
a court which refuses to follow the lead of the Gates decision and
instead continues to rely on the sensible and well established
Aguilar-Spinelli doctrine. As the Washington Court stated in
State
. Jackson, 688 P.2d 135, 139 (Wash. 1984):
Underlying the Aguilar-Spinelli test is the basic
belief that the determination of probable cause
to issue a warrant must be made by a magistrate,
not law enforcement officers who seek warrants.
To perform the constitutionally prescribed
function, rather than being a rubber stamp, a
magistrate requires an affidavit which informs
him of the underlying circumstances which led the
officer to conclude that the informant was
credible and obtained the information in a
reliable way. Only in this way (as the Court
emphasized in Aguilar and Spinelli) can the
magistrate make the proper independent judgment
about the persuasiveness of the facts relied upon
by the officer to show probable cause. Spinelli,
393 U.S. at 412-16, 89 S.Ct. at 586-89; Aguilar,
378 U.S. at 110-15, 84 S.Ct. at 1511-14.
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there are no cases directly on point to assist the Court in the
present analysis, Mr. Babbell nevertheless maintains that a
magistrate presented with the affidavit at issue in this case must
ask for the factual basis of the volunteered information in order to
protect against any possibility of police harassment or mistake.
An Aguilar-Spinelli inquiry into the sufficiency of a
search warrant affidavit requires common sense scrutiny of both the
veracity of the informant (in our case, Detective Johnson) and the
informant's basis of knowledge.

Mr. Babbell does not suggest that

the circuit court magistrate should have questioned the reliability
of Officer Johnson (unless he had previously misinformed the
court).

The factual basis of the "modus operandi" information

relayed to Detective Cazier, however, could in no way have been
demonstrated by the mere invocation of Johnson's reliability.
Indeed, as the Washington Supreme Court has warned, "a strong
showing of general trustworthiness should not compensate for failure
to explain how the informant came by his information.

The qualities

that demonstrate trustworthiness have nothing to do with
demonstrating the basis of knowledge on a particular occasion."
(emphasis added).
1984).

State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 142 (Wash.

Surely the Aguilar-Spinelli jurisprudence espoused by the

Washington Court—requiring that each prong of the sufficiency
inquiry have independent status in insuring the validity of the
information—applies as fully to information derived from a fellow
officer as it does to information derived from a reliable, long time
police informant.
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Even if this Court concludes that the present case does not
warrant application of the Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines, still
Detective Cazier's affidavit failed to afford probable cause under
the Gates analysis.

In Gates, the Supreme Court indicated that the

magistrate's "practical, common sense" review of all of the facts
and circumstances set forth in the affidavit must include an inquiry
into the "veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying
hearsay information."
(1983).^

Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332

Detective Johnson is clearly a person who supplied

"hearsay information" to Detective Cazier.

Therefore, even under

Gates, the magistrate in this case should have sought some assurance
that Johnson knew what he was talking about.

The dangers of

mistaken identity or possible police harassment are simply too
palpable to be ignored.
The present case -contrasts readily with Bailey, supra, and
State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985).

Unlike the case at

bar, the circuit court magistrates in both Bailey and Anderson were
faced with situations in which there existed substantial indicia of
both the informant's reliability and a verified factual basis of the

3

The principal difference between the Gates approach and
the Aguilar-Spinelli rule is that "veracity" and "basis of
knowledge", while still relevant, are no longer both essential.
Under Gates, a "deficiency" on either of these "prongs" may "be
compensated for "by a "strong showing" on the other prong. Gates,
103 S.Ct. at 2329. The "totality of the circumstances" analysis
downgrades the veracity and basis of knowledge elements and makes
them only "relevant considerations." Gates, 103 S.Ct. 15 2329.

- 6

-

informant's tip.

In Bailey, this Court stressed the

importance—under the Gates test—of "prior verification of [an
informant's] significant facts" carefully outlined and set out on
the face of the affidavit.

Bailey at 1206.

Similarly in Anderson/

the importance of independent verification of a tip was stressed as
was the importance of the detail with which the informant conveyed
the tip.

Anderson at 1102.
In the present case, the circuit court magistrate was

presented with no more than the bald allegation that Mr. Babbell's
"modus operandi" was the same as the assailant's and that his truck
had been seen by the police and apparently "matched" the description
of the assailant's truck.

(see Appellant's Brief, Addendum A ) .

While Detective Cazier did verify that Appellant owned a brown truck
prior to seeking a warrant, at no time did he verify the "modus
operandi" information.

The "Affidavit for Search Warrant" simply

contained no details supporting Detective Johnson's knowledge about
Mr. Babbell's alleged "modus operandi."

The affidavit was further

weakened by failing to indicate how Appellant's truck matched the
one described by witnesses.
Detective Cazier's affidavit did not supply the magistrate
below with anything like the detailed information ordinarily
required to afford probable cause to issue a search warrant.
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1.

All evidence seized pursuant to the illegally
issued warrant must be suppressed.

Without reiterating the strong policy reasons for utilizing
the Mapp standard for determining the suppressibility of evidence
(see Appellant's Brief at pp. 15-16 and 20-24), Mr. Babbell contends
that the evidence seized from his truck and home must be suppressed
since the warrant authorizing the seizure was issued without
probable cause.

Even if this Court does not adopt the Mapp standard

as a state Constitutional protection and instead employs the Leon
test or as yet untried Rule 12(g) test for the propriety of
suppression, still the evidence seized in this case must be
suppressed because of the substantial bad faith with which the
police procured and exercised the warrant (see Appellant's Brief at
pp. 17-20 and 24-26).
B. MR. BABBELLfS THREEFOLD CHALLENGE TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF THOSE ITEMS WHICH WERE SEIZED
BUT WHICH WERE NOT LISTED ON THE WARRANT WAS
PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR APPEAL.
Prior to trial below, the district court judge who heard
the case convened a suppression hearing.

At that hearing Mr.

Babbell argued that all property seized pursuant to the illegally
issued warrant should be suppressed.

Appellant further argued that

those items which were seized but which were not listed on the face
of the warrant were inadmissible because:

(1) the items were not

specifically described on the warrant as items to be seized, and (2)
the items could not justifiably be seized under the plain view
doctrine.

After a fullblown suppression hearing on these matters,
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the court suppressed some of the unlisted items and stated that the
remainder would be admissible (see Appellant's Brief at p. 6 ) . At
trial, defense counsel (fully cognizant of this Court's ruling in
State v, Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983)) lodged her pro forma
objection to the admissibility of the unlisted items by stating:
As I conveyed to the Court at the bench, I_
believe that in order to preserve my objections
to the ruling that the Court gave at the previous
motion to suppress, I need to, again, enter my
objection for the record based upon the
Defendant's Motion that not only were the items
which the Court has suppressed illegally seized,
but that the items which have now been introduced
and which were not suppressed by the Court at the
time of the suppression hearing, were also
illegally seized.
Again, our basis for that is that the affidavit
in support of the search warrant was statutorily
insufficient. And that the Justice of the Peace
or the Circuit Court Judge, who issued that, did
not have probable cause or could not have found
probable cause in which to issue such a search
warrant. And I understand that the Court will
allow me this motion as though it were made at"
the time that those items were first mentioned.
(R. 380) (emphasis added).
In its brief, at page 45, the state quotes this pro forma
objection and indicates that because the objection reiterates only
one ground of attack (i.e., the affidavit was insufficient) the
other two challenges to the admissibility of the seized evidence
were not preserved for appeal under Lesley (requiring that a
specific objection to evidence be made at trial even if a pretrial
suppression hearing is conducted).

Mr. Babbell contends that the

state's assertion is without merit.
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When defense counsel lodged her objection to the admission
of the flashlight and button, she effectively announced that it was
a pro forma objection meant to comply with the dictates of Lesley.
Counsel made the objection after some of the unlisted items had come
into evidence, and did so in order to "preserve [her] objections" to
the court's ruling at the earlier, exhaustively conducted
suppression hearing (R. 380). Further, counsel made explicit
reference to all of her earlier objections to the admissibility of
the evidence, and thereby incorporated them into the objection at
trial, when she indicated her unequivocal intention "to preserve
[her] objections to the ruling that the Court gave at the previous
motion to suppress."

(Id.).

Defense Counsel clearly complied with

both the letter and the spirit of the Lesley rule by specifically
raising, at trial, all objections to the evidence which she had made
at the pretrial hearing.
Mr. Babbell also maintains that the rationale underpinning
the Lesley opinion clearly indicates the inapplicability of the
waiver rule to the facts in this case.

In Lesley, Justice Durham

indicated that "the reasons for [the waiver] rule are well
illustrated in this case":
The judge who heard the motion to suppress was
not the trial judge, and there is no indication
in the record before us that an evidentiary
hearing on the motion was conducted. There are
no findings of fact, conclusions of law, or any
written rulings with respect to the appellant's
motion to suppress. Prior to trial, a judge is
often in a disadvantaged position to decide on
the admissibility of evidence. The trial judge
is likely to have a more complete view of the
grounds for excluding or admitting certain
evidence. When defense counsel fails to call the
trial judge's attention to any problems regarding
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the admissibility of evidence at the time it is
offered, he or she deprives the trial court of an
opportunity to avoid error in the trial which may
have been created by an improper ruling on a
pretrial motion based on inadequate information,
(emphasis added),
672 P.2d at 82.

In the present case, the trial judge was in no way

"in a disadvantaged position" to rule on the admissibility of the
disputed evidence.

He conducted a fullblown suppression hearing

during which he was briefed by both sides.

Following the hearing

the court carefully scrutinized the suppression arguments by taking
them under advisement.

Clearly the present case is far from the

Lesley situation in which the judge who tries the case is not the
one who conducted the pretrial hearing.

Defense counsel knew

precisely what the trial judge would rule in this
lodged her proforma objection.

case

when

she

This is decidedly not a case in

which counsel risked depriving "the trial court of an opportunity to
avoid error in the trial which may have been created by an improper
ruling on a pretrial motion based on inadequate information."
For the foregoing reasons, defense counsel's objection at
trial preserved POINT 1(D) (see Appellant's Brief at p. 24) for
appellate review.
POINT II
(Reply to Respondent's Point II)
HAD THE ILLEGALLY SEIZED PROPERTY BEEN SUPPRESSED,
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WOULD HAVE BEEN INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE GUILTY VERDICT.
As Appellant indicated in his opening brief, the state's
principal evidence in this case was:
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(1) the victim's

identification of William Babbell, and (2) the property illegally
seized from Babbell residence and vehicles.

(Appellant's Brief at

p. 29). In light of the extraordinary discrepancy between the
victim's description of her assailant and Mr. Babbell's physical
characteristics (see Appellant's Brief at pp. 3 and 30), had the
illegally seized property been properly suppressed reasonable minds
could not have found Mr. Babbell guilty of the crimes charged beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The State contends that Appellant's insufficiency argument
is "little more than a request for this Court to engage in cte novo
review of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of
witnesses."

(Respondent's Brief at p. 49). Quite to the contrary,

however, Mr. Babbell's argument simply urges the Court to review the
record below for insufficiency of the evidence—pursuant to the
guidelines announced in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442 (Utah
1983)—in light of the Court's recent warnings concerning eyewitness
identification.

See, State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)

requiring that trial courts give a cautionary instruction whenever
eyewitness identification is central to a case).
In Long this Court recognized that all significant, state
of the art studies "lead inexorably to the conclusion that human
perception is inexact and human memory is both limited and
fallible."

721 P.2d at 488.

The Court also acknowledged that, in

cases such as the present one, "when an observer is experiencing a
marked degree of stress, perceptual abilities are known to decrease
significantly" (citation omitted).

Icl. at 489.

Further, the Court

noted that "as eyewitnesses wend their way through the criminal
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justice process, their reports of what was seen and heard tend to
become 'more accurate, more complete and less ambiguous' in
appearance," and that "the accuracy of an identification is, at
times, inversely related to the confidence with which it is made"
(citations omitted),

Td. at 490.

Mr. Babbell simply and respectfully urges this Court to
recall the compelling impetus for the Long opinion when reviewing
the record in the present case:

"the annals of criminal law are

rife with instances of mistaken identification."

United States v.

Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in his opening brief,
Appellant urges this court to reverse his convictions and dismiss
the charges against him, or, alternatively, remand his case for a
new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/ J6

day of January, 1987.
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